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HOW UNITED STATES V. JONES CAN RESTORE 
OUR FAITH IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Erica Goldberg*† 
United States v. Jones,1 issued in January of this year, is a landmark case 
that has the potential to restore a property-based interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment to prominence. In 1967, the Supreme Court abandoned its pre-
vious Fourth Amendment framework, which had viewed the prohibition on 
unreasonable searches in light of property and trespass laws, and replaced it 
with a rule protecting the public’s reasonable expectations of privacy.2 Alt-
hough the Court may have intended this reasonable expectations test to 
provide more protection than a test rooted in property law, the new test in 
fact made the Justices’ subjective views about privacy paramount, resulted 
in circular logic, and over time diminished Fourth Amendment protection. 
Jones, which held that attaching a GPS device to a suspect’s car without a 
proper warrant violates the Fourth Amendment because attachment of the 
device constitutes a physical intrusion upon the car,3 reinvigorates the pre-
1967 property-based framework. The case indicates that a governmental 
intrusion is a search if it violates a reasonable expectation of privacy or con-
stitutes a physical intrusion of property. Jones is itself rather limited in 
scope, but it could provide the foundation for a paradigm shift in the inter-
pretation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Most of the commentary on Jones has focused on the impact of the deci-
sion on the scope of Fourth Amendment rights. However, Jones’s potential 
impact is far broader than outcomes in particular Fourth Amendment cases. 
Jones should restore our faith in the Fourth Amendment—not necessarily 
because it is more protective of Fourth Amendment rights, but because it 
gives the Justices a more concrete framework to determine whether the gov-
ernment has executed a search. Because Jones has supplemented the 
reasonableness inquiry with a physical trespass test, the determination of 
whether government action constitutes a search can be based on objective 
factors. Over time, this should make the results of Fourth Amendment cases 
more predictable and defensible and perhaps will reduce much of the cyni-
cism surrounding Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
Jones is hardly the last word in the evolution of Fourth Amendment doc-
trine. As the concurrence in Jones points out, Jones itself does not apply to 
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 † Suggested Citation: Erica Goldberg, Commentary, How United States v. Jones Can 
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 1. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259). 
 2. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 3. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 946. 
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the common scenario where the government engages in intrusive behavior 
that does not involve physical intrusion onto property (e.g., utilizing GPS 
technology to track the location of an individual’s cell phone).4 For now, 
such intrusions are examined only under the “reasonable expectations” test. 
However, if the Court fully embraces the logic of Jones, such intrusions 
could be considered searches, regardless of whether any particular Justice 
believes the government’s action to be reasonable, because they rise to the 
level of trespass to chattels. 
A. The Pre-Jones Test for Searches 
The Fourth Amendment’s ban on “unreasonable searches and seizures”5 
offers little guidance to judges on how to protect individuals from overzeal-
ous criminal investigations. The text does not provide any coherent 
principles for determining when a search or seizure is unreasonable, or even 
whether a search or seizure has occurred at all. As a result, the Supreme 
Court has been sharply divided on questions as fundamental as the nature of 
the right being protected by the Fourth Amendment and whether this right 
sounds in concerns for property or privacy. 
Assessing the constitutionality of a purported search occurs in two stag-
es. First, the court must determine whether the government’s action 
constitutes a “search,” requiring Fourth Amendment protection. The Fourth 
Amendment thus does not apply to a wide swath of intrusive government 
action that cannot be deemed a search. Once government action is consid-
ered a search, the court then analyzes whether the search is reasonable. This 
analysis, which often involves a balancing of the individual privacy interest 
at stake against the government’s reason for performing the search, has al-
lowed “a shifting majority of th[e Supreme] Court the authority to answer 
all Fourth Amendment questions by consulting its momentary vision of the 
social good.”6  
Over the past several decades, the Justices have rightfully expressed 
cynicism about the analysis used to adjudicate our Fourth Amendment 
rights. Prior to United States v. Jones, the threshold question of whether a 
governmental intrusion was deemed a search depended solely on the highly 
subjective question, first articulated in Katz v. United States, of whether the 
government had intruded upon a reasonable expectation of privacy. Like 
Jones, Katz effectuated a paradigm shift in understanding the basis for our 
Fourth Amendment rights. By holding that attaching an electronic surveil-
lance device to a public telephone booth constitutes a search for which the 
government must first obtain a warrant even though there was no physical 
trespass, the Supreme Court in Katz discarded a textual analysis of the 
Fourth Amendment based on property rights and instead hinged the 
Amendment upon evolving notions of privacy. 
                                                                                                                      
 4. Id. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 5. U.S. Const. amend. IV.  
 6. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 370 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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Previously, the textualist and originalist interpretations of the Fourth 
Amendment had defined searches as intrusions upon physical property. This 
is because the Fourth Amendment explicitly protects “persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects,” and the common law at the time of the Framing 
concerned itself with protecting property rights against the ransacking of 
houses by the government.7 Olmstead v. United States, later repudiated by 
Katz, had held that tapping telephone wires on public streets did not consti-
tute a Fourth Amendment search because “[t]here [i]s no entry of the houses 
or offices of the defendants.”8 Breaking from tradition, Katz held that the 
Fourth Amendment is instead concerned with protecting the individual from 
infringements upon an “expectation of privacy . . . . that society is prepared 
to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ”9 
Katz was intended to broaden Fourth Amendment protections and un-
moor it from Olmstead’s rigid connection to property. The dissenting 
Justices in Olmstead believed that wedding the Fourth Amendment to prop-
erty rights was misguided in an era where technological advancements 
could mean great intrusions into personal privacy without any physical tres-
pass.10 However, reliance on the value-laden notion of “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” actually has eroded Fourth Amendment rights and 
our faith in the Fourth Amendment’s ability to provide meaningful protec-
tion. The Justices have sparred about what privacy rights citizens reasonably 
expect. The Court has resorted to the use of balancing tests, and often the 
government’s interest in investigating and deterring crime has won out over 
the individual’s interest against unreasonable intrusions.11 In a series of cas-
es, the Court held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy (1) in 
private fields, fenced in and guarded by a no-trespassing sign,12 (2) in an 
individual’s garbage in opaque bags left on the curb for the trash collector,13 
and (3) when a helicopter flew 400 feet above an individual’s mobile 
home.14 If the Court had used a Fourth Amendment framework based on 
invasions of property, the result of these cases might have been quite differ-
ent. The Court could have determined, for instance, that garbage remains 
                                                                                                                      
 7. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928). 
 8. Id. at 464. 
 9. See United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 10. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead, noted that 
[t]he progress of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not 
likely to stop with wire tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the gov-
ernment, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and 
by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the 
home. 
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). “Can it be,” he asked, “that the Constitu-
tion affords no protection against such invasions of individual security?” Id. 
 11. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 151–53 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 12. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
 13. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
 14. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
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one’s property so long as it sits on one’s curb for exclusive transfer to the 
garbage collector. Regardless of the outcome, using a property-based  
approach would certainly have put the Court’s opinion on a firmer founda-
tion that would have allowed it to render decisions based on generally 
applicable rules instead of ad hoc analysis. The Court could have deter-
mined that flying a helicopter at 400 feet above someone’s home did not 
constitute a trespass because helicopters are permitted into that airspace and 
because “there [i]s no undue noise, and no wind, dust, or threat of injury.”15 
Instead, the Court based its decision on the public being legally permitted to 
fly at that low of an altitude over someone’s home, but could (or would) not 
hold “that an inspection of the curtilage of a house from an aircraft will al-
ways pass muster under the Fourth Amendment simply because the plane is 
within the navigable airspace specified by law.”16  
Perhaps worse than curtailing our Fourth Amendment protections, 
Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test became a way for the Justices 
to appoint themselves arbiters of which privacy expectations to afford socie-
ty. Instead of determining whether privacy expectations were reasonable, 
based on empirical notions of when most citizens regard their possessions or 
conversations as being private, the Justices applied Katz normatively, based 
on how privacy should operate. Justice Harlan, whose concurring opinion in 
Katz established the reasonable expectation of privacy test, later wrote, 
“[s]ince it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as mirror and 
reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and risks 
without examining the desirability of saddling them upon society.”17 By de-
ciding when the government had intruded upon a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, the Justices had assigned themselves the power to dictate to society 
when society’s assumptions about privacy were acceptable. This normative 
view could be both broader and narrower than society’s actual expectations 
of privacy, and decisions were often based on the Justices’ own experiences, 
which may have been similar to each other’s but which were not the norm 
for society.18 
Of course, the Justices have differed on the normative question of when 
individuals should be permitted to assume that their possessions and conver-
sations are private. In California v. Greenwood, for instance, the majority 
believed that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s gar-
bage left on the curb outside one’s home, because “[i]t is common 
knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street 
are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other 
                                                                                                                      
 15. Id. at 452. 
 16. Id. at 451. 
 17. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 18. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F. 3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“No truly poor people are appointed as federal 
judges, or as state judges for that matter. Judges, regardless of race, ethnicity or sex, are se-
lected from the class of people who don't live in trailers or urban ghettos. The everyday 
problems of people who live in poverty are not close to our hearts and minds because that’s 
not how we and our friends live.”). 
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members of the public.”19 The dissent contended instead that “scrutiny of 
another’s trash is contrary to commonly accepted notions of civilized behav-
ior.”20 Justice Brennan in dissent argued that “members of our society will 
be shocked to learn that the Court, the ultimate guarantor of liberty, deems 
unreasonable our expectation that the aspects of our private lives that are 
concealed safely in a trash bag will not become public.”21  
By the Justices’ own design, there is no touchstone for determining 
whether the dissent or the majority had the correct position in Greenwood. 
The question of whether we have a reasonable expectation of privacy in any 
dimension of our lives was, prior to Jones, entirely circular. If the Supreme 
Court held that individuals had no reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
garbage, for example, then individuals could not reasonably assume that 
their garbage was secure against warrantless, suspicionless police intrusion. 
We could reasonably expect privacy from police intrusions only when the 
Court deemed our expectations of privacy are reasonable. 
B. Justice Scalia’s New (Old) Approach 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Jones, over a four-judge concurrence 
authored by Justice Alito, consolidated the competing approaches of 
Olmstead and Katz. A search now occurs either when there is a state-law 
trespass upon property, as in Olmstead, or when the government infringes 
upon a reasonable expectation of privacy, per Katz. The majority opinion in 
Jones thus resurrects the pre-Katz link between the Fourth Amendment and 
property rights without changing the rule that the Fourth Amendment is also 
violated by intrusions upon privacy. According to Justice Scalia, “We have 
no doubt that such a physical intrusion [as attaching a GPS device to an in-
dividual’s car] would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”22 The majority’s return to a 
textual and historical analysis of the Fourth Amendment has the potential to 
force the Justices to answer to something more concrete than the “reasona-
bleness” standard. This opinion adds much needed clarity and objectivity to 
Fourth Amendment analysis. By focusing on property rights, the Justices 
may now use property intrusions as a proxy for when privacy has been un-
constitutionally violated. 
Ironically, to achieve this properly principled framework, the opinion 
distorts precedent in unrecognizable ways, without ever acknowledging that 
it is doing so. As Justice Alito notes in his concurrence, the connection be-
tween the Fourth Amendment and property was abandoned in United States 
v. Katz, and it “has little if any support in current Fourth Amendment case 
                                                                                                                      
 19. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988). 
 20. Id. at 45 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 21. Id. at 46. 
 22. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) . 
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law.”23 The Court previously noted that it had “decoupled violation of a  
person’s Fourth Amendment rights from trespassory violation of his proper-
ty.”24  
To be fair, the Court in prior cases has looked to property law in as-
sessing whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists (or whether a 
search is reasonable),25 but Justice Scalia’s major contribution in Jones is 
holding that a physical trespass in and of itself, when performed to acquire 
information, constitutes a search regardless of reasonable expectations of 
privacy. Although the Jones test is currently a supplement to the Katz test, 
this move away from the normative reasonableness inquiry will render 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence more certain for individuals, police offic-
ers, and judges, and ultimately may prove more protective of Fourth 
Amendment rights. The results in any particular case may still require courts 
to exercise their own judgment and interpretation of property rights, but 
their decisions will be guided by something other than their own personal 
evaluations of reasonableness. 
C. Beyond the Physical 
As Justice Alito remarks, Justice Scalia’s addition of the more definitive 
physical trespass test provides no extra protection against nonphysical 
searches, such as GPS tracking performed through cell phones. Concerns 
like Justice Alito’s regarding non-physical searches are what led the Katz 
majority to abandon the property-based framework. Perhaps the best solu-
tion to this problem is the one presented by Justice Alito himself. Although 
Justice Alito disputes this, a historical understanding of the Fourth Amend-
ment is not inconsistent with an updating of society’s notions of property 
rights. The Justices can undertake a property-based Fourth Amendment 
analysis, as intended by the Framers, while incorporating modern-day prop-
erty law, which applies to electronic trespasses such as spamming one’s 
email account.26 Justice Alito recognizes that courts have held that “the 
                                                                                                                      
 23. Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring). In Greenwood, for example, the Court did not 
examine whether an individual’s trash is abandoned property because “the reach of the Fourth 
Amendment is not determined by state property law.” 486 U.S. at 51 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 24. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001). 
 25. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006) (“The constant element in as-
sessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness in the consent cases, then, is the great significance 
given to widely shared social expectations, which are naturally enough influenced by the law 
of property, but not controlled by its rules.”); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) 
(noting that an expectation of privacy is reasonable if it has “a source outside of the Fourth 
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understand-
ings that are recognized and permitted by society”).  
 26. Courts have held that sending spam email and using automated robots to download 
information from websites can constitute a “trespass to chattels.” See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bid-
der’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber 
Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997). 
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transmission of electrons that occurs when a communication is sent from 
one computer to another is enough” to constitute trespass to chattels.27  
Even in the Katz electronic surveillance case, the Court could have re-
tained the connection between property rights and privacy rights by holding 
that an electronic connection to an individual’s property (or to the phone 
company’s property) is a physical intrusion, albeit on a microscopic level. In 
Olmstead v. United States,28 overturned by Katz, the phone companies ar-
gued that wiretapping, even on lines outside one’s home, technically 
trespasses upon telephone lines belonging to private phone companies and 
devoted to the exclusive use of the callers.29 Similarly, Internet Service Pro-
viders (“ISP”) turning over emails stored or transmitted through an ISP’s 
systems involves a trespass upon the ISP’s microchips.30 Justice Scalia’s 
rationale, if updated to consider electronic penetration a form of trespass, 
would permit the labeling of more intrusions as searches, whether they look 
like traditional trespasses or modern-day, electronic trespasses. 
One problem with this approach is that states might differ in what prop-
erty rights they afford their citizens, while Fourth Amendment protections 
must be uniform across the country. However, the Court could simply use a 
physical-occupation test. There are also nonsubjective, empirical ways to 
measure which property rights are the most frequently granted throughout 
the country, have existed for the longest, or are in some way the most analo-
gous to those contemplated by the Framers. The Fourth Amendment can be 
interpreted using its historical connection to property while modernizing our 
notions of property rights. 
Conclusion 
The best way to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights against political 
pressures and shifting majorities’ notions of the social good is to make the 
first prong of Fourth Amendment analysis—whether government action 
constitutes a search—more concrete. Jones’s resurrection of the link be-
tween searches and property, though a significant and somewhat 
disingenuous departure from precedent, is a substantial step toward this end. 
Although Justice Scalia merely supplemented Katz’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy test with Olmstead’s property-based approach and did not eradi-
cate Katz entirely, further development of the jurisprudence and a more 
explicit focus on property rights as an objective proxy for privacy expecta-
tions has the potential to diminish the subjectivity and circularity currently 
plaguing Fourth Amendment analysis. Over time, especially if trespass to 
chattels is considered a search, Jones may cover most of the territory  
                                                                                                                      
 27. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).  
 28. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 29. Sam Kamin & Ricardo J. Bascuas, Investigative Criminal Procedure: A 
Contemporary Approach 15-16 (2011). 
 30. Instead, the Sixth Circuit decided a case involving these facts based on the Katz 
formulation. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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currently protected by Katz and could ultimately replace Katz as a clearer, 
cleaner metric of when the Fourth Amendment is implicated. There is too 
much room for debate about whether rifling through one’s garbage is “con-
trary to commonly accepted notions of civilized behavior,” but there is no 
doubt that attaching a GPS device to Antoine Jones’ car constituted a physi-
cal intrusion upon his property. 
